Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Policy (1985-2015)
Volume 12

Issue 1

Article 11

1995

Could We Hold People Responsible for Their Own Adverse
Health?
John Harris

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/jchlp

Recommended Citation
John Harris, Could We Hold People Responsible for Their Own Adverse Health?, 12 J. Contemp. Health L.
& Pol'y 147 (1996).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/jchlp/vol12/iss1/11

This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Policy (1985-2015) by an authorized editor of CUA
Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu.

COULD WE HOLD PEOPLE RESPONSIBLE FOR
THEIR OWN ADVERSE HEALTH?
John Harris*t

I.

INTRODUCTION

There has been much recent controversy about the ethics of holding
people responsible for their own adverse health state and about prioritising health care delivery on this basis. It has been suggested that people
who have been, and perhaps continue to be, responsible for their own
adverse health should have a lower priority for care than their more "innocent" fellow citizens, or should bear a higher proportion of the costs of
their care than others. Such suggestions have been made about smokers,
people with HIV/AJDS, and people who participate in some dangerous
sports or pastimes like climbing, pot-holing, and hang gliding.
There are obvious attractions in holding people responsible for their
own adverse health state in so far as they are responsible for it, and for
prioritising care on this basis. For one thing, it seems unfair that people
who have, wholly or in part, caused their own illness should be treated
while other "innocent" victims have to wait. Then there are obvious costsaving advantages to a hard pressed health care system if it can reasonably demand a share of the costs of treatment in proportion to personal
responsibility for ill health. For related reasons, health care providers
would find it attractive to have a fair basis for prioritization in some
cases. Finally, politicians are often attracted to policies which reinforce
popular prejudices against unpopular groups. We have seen this in connection with the treatment of HIV/AIDS, and as the popularity and fashionableness of cigarettes declines, we are increasingly observing it in
connection with smoking.'
There are of course powerful counter arguments to the attractions of
* Professor of Bioethics and Applied Philosophy and Research Director of The Centre for Social Ethics and Policy, University of Manchester.
t [The footnotes in this article comport to the system used at the University of
Manchester.]
1. See for example Julian Le Grand Equity and Choice Harper Collins, London,
1981. See also an interesting critique of Le Grand's ideas Hugh V. McLachlan "Smokers,
Virgins, equity and health care costs" in The Journal of Medical Ethics 21.4. August 1995.
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such a policy. However, I shall not here be so much concerned with the
merits of these claims, or the ethics of a policy of responsibility for health.
Rather, I am interested in the question of whether it would be possible or
desirable to attempt to implement such a policy however good the apparent justifications.
Let us grant a proposition that I believe to be false; that it is fair and
reasonable to hold people responsible for their own adverse health (in so
far as this lies within their own control) and to prioritise care on this
basis.2 Could we implement such a policy ethically and would we wish to
bear the costs of so doing?
I will start by reviewing some of the ethical assumptions behind the
idea that it is ethical and reasonable, in principle, to hold people responsible for ill health that they have wholly or partly brought on themselves. I
will then turn to the issue of the sorts of social institutions we would have
to create in order to pursue a policy of prioritising on the basis of personal responsibility for health.
II.

PRINCIPLE:

RESPONSIBILITY FOR ONE'S OWN ADVERSE

HEALTH STATE

Let's take the issue of smoking as our touchstone. There are two good
reasons and one problem for discrimination against smokers when prioritising health care. The good reasons are that smoking is seen as both
voluntary and unnecessary; its harmful effects are well established. The
problem is the fact that smoking is addictive and that many people acquired the addiction before its harmful effects were known. Thus, they
may not be fully responsible for such affects. Indeed, it might even be
argued that governments have connived at these harmful effects for the
sake of the tax revenue that smoking generates'
However, let's assume that smoking is fully voluntary and ignore the
issue of the contribution made by smokers to national economies. One
consideration often adduced in favour of discriminating against smokers
2. For some of the arguments as to why it is doubtful that we should use age, life
expectancy or merit to determine the allocation of public resources for health see my:
"More & Better Justice" in Sue Mendus and Martin Bell Eds. Philosophy And Medical
Welfare, Cambridge, University Press, 1988. 75-97. "Does Justice Require that we be
Ageist?" - Bioethics Vol. 8. No. 1. January 1994. 74-84. "National Health = National De-

fence" in Issues in Focus August 1992. page 38.
3. There is some merit in the claim that smoking is even connived at or encouraged
by the government for its revenue generating effects or because of the impact of the tobacco industry on society or as political lobbyists.
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is the suggestion that when faced with a choice between treating a persistent smoker and someone who has diligently attempted to protect their
own health by avoiding smoking, it would be unfair to prefer the smoker.
The argument behind this judgment may be that the smoker should not
be "rewarded" for her recklessness, while the prudent individual is "punished" for taking care of her own health. We should remember that it is
not entirely true that a nonsmoker who is given a lower priority for treatment than a smoker has had the benefit of their virtue negated in some
way. Nonsmokers do get benefit from their virtue; they are less likely to
need health care. They do have their fair, deserved advantage over
smokers. They have already been rewarded personally and statistically
for their virtue. Should they be rewarded again by the public health care
system? Does their virtue increase their entitlement to benefit from public health care?
Then there is the suggestion that the smoker should not be preferred to
the nonsmoker; that such a preference would be unfair in that it rewarded
virtue at the expense of vice. No one is, I think, suggesting that smokers
should be preferred to nonsmokers; but should they have an equal chance
of access to health care?
If they are given an equal chance of care and treatment then, of course,
smokers will sometimes be treated while nonsmokers are not. It may be
unfair in some cosmic sense when the virtuous suffer and the less virtuous
prosper. But should we use public resources and even legislation to try to
ensure that this does not happen? And if we do so, are we in danger of
punishing people for their choice of lifestyle and doing so in a way that
not only violates principles of natural justice, but creates additional and
gratuitous injustice?
A. Double Jeopardy
It is sometimes said that giving smokers a low priority in the allocation
of health care resources is justified; not as a punishment for smokers or a
reward for the virtue of abstainers, but because to fail to do so would
encourage dangerous and anti-social habits in the community and fail to
give a much needed incentive to people to give up cigarettes. However, if
the prospect of better health and a longer life on the one hand and fear of
premature death from cancer or heart disease on the other does not act as
an incentive, it is unlikely that the further fear of failure to get priority in
medical care will add much to the incentives and disincentives already in
place. If it is correct that refusals to treat or low positions on waiting lists

150

Journalof Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 12:147

are unlikely to have much impact on behaviour, then discrimination
against smokers in the allocation of health care resources will effectively
function as a punishment and should be seen as such.
This raises a large issue which we have no space here to tackle adequately. It is the question of the appropriateness of allowing doctors, or
indeed the health care system, to hand out punishments and rewards for
behaviour that is quite legal. If this is effectively a form of punishment,
and in so far as it is, it would be punishment without a hearing or trial by
individuals who were effectively judge, jury, and executioner rolled into
one. Moreover, there would be little prospect of appeal or remission of
sentence. Not only is there a problem of double jeopardy-punishing
people twice for the same offence (once by their contracting a condition
caused by smoking and a second time by the refusing to treat that condition)-but there is also an insurmountable problem of natural justice.
There are two fundamental principles of natural justice that would be
breached in such a case; indeed, which are breached when doctors refuse
treatments on the basis of lifestyle. The first is that no one be condemned
unheard; the second requires that no one be a judge in his own cause.4
Where a patient is refused treatment and the consequence is that they
suffer or indeed die for want of treatment that could have been provided
to them and where this happens unfairly, they have certainly been condemned. In combination, these two principles provide a formidable objection to any attempts, whether intended or not, to use refusals to treat
as a punishment for lifestyle.5 I am far from convinced that people who
take care of their own health should be rewarded more than their own
efforts already reward them; or that people who fail to do so should be
disadvantaged further than their carelessness has already disadvantaged
them. But I do not think there are overwhelming arguments either way,
at least so far as principle goes. But what of policy?

III. POLICY
Suppose we tried as a matter of policy to hold people responsible for
4. See for example Stanley de Smith and Rodney Brazier Constitutionaland Administrative Law Seventh edition, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1994. pp. 602-617.
5. It is well established that just as measures intended as a punishment can operate,
defacto, as a tax; so measures intended as an incentive or carrot, may, perhaps, operate as
a punishment or stick. A classic example of the former was the fine (approximately 40
shillings) for soliciting. The fine was so small when compared with earnings that prostitutes treated it as a tax which they gladly paid for the privilege of working the streets.
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their own adverse health state and distribute access to health care accordingly. What would it be like if we tried to do this?
If care and protection on the one hand and priority for treatment on
the other is to vary according to an individual's own responsibility for her
adverse health state, few would merit care and protection or have anything but a low priority. From creamcakes to car racing, from smoking to
obesity, we are almost all "guilty" to some degree.
A. Prioritisingon the Basis of Responsibility for Health State
At the moment, the focus of people's concern about the injustice of
rewarding those responsible for their own adverse health state has centred almost exclusively on smoking and those with HIV/AIDS. This is,
perhaps, revealing but hardly surprising. Smoking is now unfashionable
and the focus of massive public health campaigns. Persons with HIV/
AIDS have been the victims of extraordinary malice, stigmatization, and
discrimination. Indeed, it has not been uncommon to hear talk of a distinction between "innocent" and "guilty"-those who acquired HIV via a
blood transfusion or other medically administered blood products, and
those who acquired the virus through sexual activity or intravenous drug
use.
However, it is clear that any serious list of people who have or share
responsibility for their own adverse health state would have to include a
high proportion of the entire population. This can clearly be seen if we
briefly rehearse a list of some of the anti-social behaviours that would

have to be included in anything approaching a comprehensive attempt to
catalogue appropriately responsible (or should we say "irresponsible")
citizens.
Those who indulge in risky sports and pastimes (squash, football,
rugby, pot-holing, climbing, hang gliding), those who don't indulge in
sports and thus become unfit or obese, those who have less than an optimal diet (whether in the form of creamcakes, animal fats, hydrogenated
fats, animal protein, etc.), or those who eat too much or too little would
all have to be included. Then there are those who wilfully or recklessly
engage in risky or unhealthy types of employment or frequent dangerous
or unhealthy workplaces (fire officers, police officers, the armed services,
factory workers, and health care workers).
Next we must consider those who wilfully and perversely choose to be
dwellers in industrial cities with their inherent risk of pollution, road accidents, and violent crime. We know of course that certain geographical

152

Journalof Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 12:147

locations are also inherently unsafe. This might be from such features as
proximity to nuclear installations or naturally occurring radon, or because
country dwellers are so often dangerously distant from a major hospital.
It might be because people who live in the north of the United Kingdom
or the south of Italy have significantly greater or lesser mortality and
know or should know the dangers or benefits of such locations.
This brief survey of some of the ways in which people might reasonably
be held responsible for their own adverse health state has revealed how
extensive such responsibility might be. It has also revealed, to some extent, the scale of difficulty there would be in assessing such things as the
degree of responsibility which people might have and the extent to which
someone's choice of pastime, job, domicile, or even sexual partner was
either fully informed or autonomous.
B. Knowledge and Information
Even if a metric for responsibility could be devised which would do
justice to the different ways and circumstances in which people contribute, for better or worse, to their own health state, there remains the problem of information. If we are to distribute access to health care in the
light of such responsibility, then health professionals and administrators
need to have immediate access to the relevant information at the point of
need or claim. To take just one example, in order to prioritise care, the
casualty officer in the accident must know precisely the degree of responsibility of every casualty she sees and she must know it immediately. If
this were not possible, huge injustices would occur and reasonable questions would arise as to the legitimacy of making those on whom information happened to be available bear the whole brunt of our attempts to
redistribute health care according to this particular conception of a meritocracy of health. Even if, per -impossible,such complete information
could be made available, there remains the question of whether it would
be desirable for other reasons (which would include privacy and the dangers of abuse) to support such comprehensive information gathering and
monitoring.
IV.

CONCLUSION

I hope two conclusions have emerged. The first is the far from overwhelming nature of the attractiveness of a proposal to hold people responsible for their adverse health state, and consequently, give such
persons a low priority in the allocation of resources for health care. The
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second is the pervasive nature of our responsibility for our own health
state and the likelihood of it proving impossible to either devise a metric
for the allocation of such responsibility or to cope with the ethical and
practical problems of coping with the gathering, management, and availability of information that would be required.

